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abstract 
Purpose: Over the past twenty years, GMOs have raised enormous expectations, passionate political controversies, 
and an on-going debate on how should these technologies be assessed. Current risk-assessment procedures 
generally assess GMOs in terms of their potential risk of negatively affecting human health and the environment. 
Yet, is this risk-benefit approach appropriate to a deliver a robust assessment of GMOs? In this paper, we question 
the validity of current risk-assessment from both a social and an ecological perspective, and we elaborate an 
alternative approach, namely in-context trajectory evaluation
Methods: This paper combines frame analysis, context analysis and eco-social analysis to three different case 
studies. 
Results: Applying frame analysis to Syngenta´s recent campaign “Bring plant potential to life”, we first de-construct 
the techno-social imaginaries driving GMOs innovation, showing how the latter endorses the technological fix of 
socio-economic problems while reinforcing the neoliberal socio-political paradigm. Applying context analysis to 
biopharming in New Zealand, we then explore local practices, rules and formal and informal procedures, showing 
that to assess how safe is a technology it is necessary to  address how “safe” is the context. Finally, drawing from 
the Italian case, we outline through eco-social analysis how the lack of long-term studies, further aggravated by 
current methodological deficiencies, prevent risk-assessment from considering not only how GMOs affect the 
environmental context but also, and most importantly, the way people live in, and interact with, this context. 
Conclusions: Whilst it emerges that there might be a number of socio-political reasons to support a moratorium on 
GMOs in Europe even if they come to be considered technically safe, these results suggest that the integration of in-
context trajectory evaluation with traditional risk assessment procedures may help promoting social compatibility, 
political accountability and ecological sustainability. 
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1. introduction 
Over the past twenty years, biotechnologies have raised enormous expectations as well as 
passionate political controversies, paving the way to a strong polarization in European societies, 
to permanent tensions with the US about commercialization under WTO agreements, and to 
an on-going debate over risk assessment and risk management procedures. Mainstream risk 
assessment approaches conventionally understand risk assessment as “a factually grounded, 
objective and value free analytic exercise” (Busch et al. 2004). Accordingly, new technologies 
should be assessed in terms of their potential risk of negatively affecting human health and in 
terms of their environmental risks (Davies 2009). 
Risk assessment procedures, however, have not driven out all concerns about GMOs, whilst 
doubts have been raised about the enormous pressures exerted by multinational corporations 
active in the fields of GMOs as well as about the conflict of interests that may potentially 
affect the scientific experts working for regulating authorities like the EFSA. The independence 
and reliability of risk assessment procedures have been contested not only because they have 
often been carried out by the same multinational corporations producing the GMOs under 
evaluation but also because the original data, for commercial reasons, have not been released to 
the academic community (Johnson et al. 2007).
Moreover, recent advances in genetics show that the genome is a complex system, which, far 
from being a mechanistic sequence of genes independent of each other, can be considered as an 
eco-system where all genes interact on a permanent basis (Buiatti 2004). This new understanding 
of the genome has raised important questions on long-term unpredictable consequences of 
genetic engineering, but the EFSA has not yet acknowledged the complexity and attendant 
uncertainty of GMOs (2009).1 In addition, a number of independent studies on GMOs have 
generated results that raise questions about official assurances of safety (Le Curieux-Belfond et 
al. 2009; Seralini et al. 2009; Seralini, Cellier and Spiroux de Vendomois 2007; Gasnier et al. 
2009; Heinemann, Sparrow and Traavik 2004; Traavik and Heinemann 2007). 
The universality, objectivity and neutrality of risk-assessment methods have also been 
questioned, particularly in contexts of low scientific certainty, high stakes (Funtowicz and 
Ravetz 1992) and low social and political consensus (Winickoff et al. 2005). If “science and 
values interact dynamically in the process of risk analysis, even at early stages when risks are 
first being assessed” (Winickoff et al. 2005), then scientific uncertainty requires judgement 
calls to be made, which will inevitably reflects the values of those making the calls. These 
judgement calls are typically embodied in criteria for acceptable technical data and methods. As 
pointed out by a UN FAO expert on food safety, such criteria are imbued with values when, for 
1   For more information, please refer to the EFSA Conference on “GMO risk assessment for 
Human and Animal Health and the Environment - 14-15 September 2009”, http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/
efsa_locale-1178620753812_1211902768091.htm
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instance, choices have to be made whether hazard identifications should be based on mortality 
or morbidity, or whether they should be based on “best practice” or “typical use”. Moreover, 
different extrapolation models may be required when moving from animal to human toxicity 
studies or when shifting from micro-ecosystems to farm-scale agricultural environments (in 
Winickoff et al. 2005 with reference to FAO 2002). Finally risk-assessment procedures also 
incorporate assumptions, obviously value-laden, on the significance given to the distribution of 
risks, on what constitutes a benefit worth taking a risk for, and what level of risk is acceptable.
Not only can risk assessment not be value-free, it also cannot be divorced from consideration 
of the context(s)—both biophysical and socio-political—in which the technology is to be 
implemented. That is, assessing risk—identifying and estimating the nature, magnitude and 
likelihood of potential harms—must include consideration of social context, including the 
attitudes and practices of those (individuals and institutions) involved in managing risk. 
Localised neglect or flouting of risk-management protocols, weak enforcement or monitoring 
procedures, ineffective norms, lack of transparency or reluctant authorities—all are relevant 
to risk assessment. In effect, risk-assessment and risk management cannot be really separated. 
This is why it has been argued that risk-assessment procedures cannot operate on the basis of 
technical expertise only: lay expertise, users’ expertise and social science expertise need to be 
taken into account (Wynne 1992, Irwin 1995, Liberatore and Funtowicz 2003).  
Finally, and crucially, risk-assessment and risk-management procedures typically operate only 
when the technology has already been developed and is ready for experimental and commercial 
authorization. Yet, this technology has already had an impact on society: public and private 
resources have been invested; universities, companies and start-ups have been involved; promises 
have been made; and social and political associations and movements have been mobilized 
(Van Lente and Rip 1998). All of these processes, which have led to the actual technology 
being developed, have changed the innovation regime, the research agenda priorities and the 
actual allocation of public resources and even the perception of the problem for which this 
technology was first developed. Social and political values, therefore, are not only embedded in 
risk-assessment procedures; they are also embedded in the very technology that risk-assessment 
procedures try to evaluate. 
2. Frame analysis: Gmos are the solution, but what was the 
Problem?
Narrowing down the debate to whether GMOs constitute a threat to human health and the 
environment, risk-assessment approaches have reduced the evaluation of GMOs merely to a 
question of how much risk a society can bear in exchange for the potential benefits claimed 
for the technology. Yet there is much more to the implications of GMOs than the risk/benefit 
relationship suggests. This will be illustrated here by an examination of the current public 
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relations campaign by Syngenta, in particular, of the way Syngenta frames the issue of GMOs.
Frames, in the social sciences, are “principles of selection, emphasis and presentation composed 
of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters” (Jasanoff 2003: 241, 
as quoted in Busch et al. 2004:16). Framing is active at all times and is a function of our desire 
to control and master events that look complex at first sight. Frames help the analyst to order 
their experiences of reality into patterns of causes and effects so that a given problem can be 
understood and addressed. As a consequence, frame analysis should constitute a fundamental 
tool of policy studies and policy-making, because a better understanding of the frames used 
to make sense of a given problem is essential to evaluate the solution suggested to solve that 
problem (Jasanoff 2003).  It can, for example, help to identify when the proposed solution 
is an inappropriate “technological fix”, through which problems that have social, economic 
or political causes are framed and addressed in terms of a technological “solution”.  Such a 
solution claims to address unwanted effects but leaves untouched their non-technical origins.
Recently, Syngenta has implemented a campaign to promote societal support of GMOs in 
Europe. Syngenta’s posters can be found in various buildings across Europe, mainly airports 
and public places. There are three posters, related respectively to water scarcity, world hunger 
and child labor.  The first poster (see Fig. 1) identifies the problem at stake as a growing scarcity 
of (fresh? unpolluted?) water and frames that problem as a function of water consumption by 
crops.  
Source: www.singenta.com, “Bring plant potential to life” campaign
If this is the nature of the problem, then, it seems, we must choose between “grow[ing] less 
food” and “grow[ing] food that needs less water”, and  technological solutions to engineer plant 
varieties consuming less water not only make sense but  appear as necessary and urgent:
“Providing enough food, feed, fiber and fuel for the world’s population now and confronting 
future demands depend on whether currently available agricultural technology can be fully 
accessed by the world’s farmers”.
vincenzo Pavone, joanna Goven & riccardo Guarino
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Framing water scarcity as a technical issue paves the way to a technological solution.2 This 
obscures not only the whole array of social, economic and political factors that have resulted in 
the overuse of water, and in the pollution of water that makes it unfit for use, but also obscures 
the contribution to the problem of the very innovation regime of which Syngenta’s strategy 
is a  part.  This regime, aimed primarily at industrialised agriculture in rich countries and 
deriving profits through intellectual property  in those markets, has focused on the production 
of plant varieties that, in order to increase yield, require increased inputs in the form not only of 
pesticides but also irrigation.  In many places such varieties and methods have displaced low-
input varieties and methods developed locally (Jordan 2002).  The technological frame allows 
Syngenta to claim that consideration of such social, economic and political factors, and what 
they are likely to mean for any technology developed under this regime, is the source of the 
problem: “In effect, the rejection of sound science in assessing technology is denying food and 
income to those who would most benefit from new technologies” (Syngenta website). 
In this way, Syngenta illustrates how framing social, economic and political problems as a 
technical question can result in the delegation of essentially political decisions to expert 
committees, which effectively divert responsibility from political actors to techno-scientific 
networks and depoliticize controversial issues (Jasanoff 2003).  Indeed, Syngenta advocates 
this:
What is needed:
Government officials •	  must de-politicize their decisions on the use of technology in agriculture.
Not only do we need governments to advance technology in developing markets, we also need governments to support the •	
deployment of existing technologies across land currently under cultivation in order to raise yields and improve farming 
knowledge.
Fig. 2: Source: www.singenta.com, “Bring plant potential to life” campaign 
As Syngenta’s campaign demonstrates, “objective” risk-assessment approaches tend to encourage a technocratic 
approach to science and technology policy, which has been criticized on a number of political 
and sociological grounds (Weingart 1999; Liberatore and Funtowicz 2003; Nowotny 2003; 
Felt et al. 2007; Levidow 2009; Ferretti 2009; Ferretti and Pavone 2009). For instance, such 
approaches neglect GMOs’ impact on existing economic, political and social arrangements and 
on the developmental trajectory of the areas selected for implementation (Ferretti and Pavone 
2009). As Sheila Jasanoff (2004) puts it, technology shapes society and it is shaped by it in 
a mutually constitutive process of co-production where science, technology and social order 
emerge side by side. 
2   The same logic is applied to world hunger (farmland is limited: how do we feed a growing 
population?) and to the relationship between poverty and education (our seeds enable children to spend more 
time in the classroom).
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The development of GMOs well illustrates this phenomenon because the production of 
GM crops could only be conceived in a socio-political context where genetic traits can be 
patented. Without the reinterpretation of patenting criteria that occurred in the Eighties3, which 
extended patentability rights to plants and animal with modified genetic traits (Rouvroy 2008), 
the technique of genetic engineering may well have been developed as part of a larger basic 
research plan in molecular biology, but GMOs would have never been developed. GMOs have 
been possible only in a world in which western governments invest heavily in basic and applied 
research on biotechnologies in the attempt to build a “knowledge-dense” bio-economy (OECD 
2009) that will maintain their  competitiveness in relation to emerging economies like China, 
India and Brazil. In turn, GMOs become meaningful in a policy context where environmental 
and social problems are framed as technical so that technological (profitable) solutions can be 
elaborated, leaving unquestioned the actual causes of the problems at stake. 
The point is that approaches focusing on risk do not call into question the visions and 
imaginaries that sustain a given technology’s trajectory (Mcnaghten et al. 2005; Felt et al. 2007). 
Technological products are not neutral objects: they have been produced by specific actors, in 
specific contexts, in order to address a specific problem, which has been framed in such a way 
that given technologies make sense as solutions. As a result of the very process triggering 
their emergence, technologies are loaded with social and political values; they materialise 
certain paradigms, in fact, they “re-construct” social paradigms (ideas and assumptions about 
functioning) into physical matter – this is what could make the utility of a technology. It has 
to “fit”  the social structures managing it, and resemble the material support a social setting 
organises to stabilise and maintain itself, which will remain completely undetected as long as 
the focus of technology assessment concentrates on their risk implications. 
A thorough analysis of the ethical, social and political values and principles that each technology 
carries through the visions and imaginaries it promotes, thus, is a fundamental step towards a 
more robust  assessment of technologies in general, and GMOs in particular. If social and 
political values are implicitly and explicitly embedded in a given technology’s trajectory, risk-
assessment and risk-management procedures need to bring into these decision-making contexts 
those who can identify these embedded values and their implications, making them available 
for public and transparent discussion and deliberation. In contrast, risk assessment procedures 
take technologies for granted, non-technical expertise is not considered relevant and socio-
political analyses about technology implementation are addressed as a problem per se. Syngenta 
argues: 
Regulation that is anything other than science-based will stifle innovation and limit the ability 
of farmers to grow more food with limited natural resources. Political pre-occupations are 
3   See the key US Supreme Court decisions, e.g., Chakrabarty Vs Diamond case (1980) and the 
US legislation, the Bayh Dole Act (1980)
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causing a crisis of governance in both the developed and the developing world.
Instead of considering public concerns about GMOs as an opportunity to reconsider the 
technology from a different perspective, producing a wider and more robust assessment of 
GMOs’ implications, risk assessment experts keep considering the public as the problem, calling 
for solutions that aim at reducing this opposition rather than at learning from it (De Boer et al. 
2005). Whilst governments continue relying on scientific expertise to legitimize their policies 
choices – shifting the responsibility of emerging social conflicts to a (constructed) uninformed, 
prejudiced and reluctant public – these questions remain largely unaddressed, when not bluntly 
ignored (Wynne 2006). Meanwhile, among the public, scientists are perceived not as neutral, 
but as influenced by the commercial environment described above, and awareness is growing 
of the conflict, in the scientific community, about the possible applications of biotechnologies 
(Bucchi and Neresini 2002; 2004).  Yet public engagement exercises not only neglect these 
concerns but typically aim at getting support for science in exchange for dialogue (EC 2007).
Such approaches to public engagement have been challenged on a number of theoretical and 
empirical issues, which relate, for instance, to who is the public and how it has been constituted; 
who decides what is going to be talked about and on what grounds; and at what stage of policy 
making is participation set and why (Jasanoff 2005; Goven 2006a; Wynne 2006; Felt et al. 2007; 
Levidow 2007; Ferretti and Pavone 2009). In other words, “the purpose is to hold science and 
industry answerable, with the utmost seriousness, to the fundamental questions of democratic 
politics […] Who is making the choices that govern lives? On whose behalf? According to whose 
definitions of the good? With what rights of representation? And in which forums? (Leach, 
Scoones and Wynne 2005: 190).
Despite these criticisms, risk assessment and public engagement exercises keep addressing 
risk considerations made by the experts as ‘scientific’ and public views as ‘perceptions’, and 
the debate is highly restricted “Risks are endlessly debated, while deeper questions about the 
values, visions and vested interests that motivate scientific endeavour often remain unasked or 
unanswered” (EC 2007: 16). Meanwhile, current regimes of science and technology innovation, 
and “the driving purposes and expectations shaping innovation and knowledge” (Wynne 2006: 
218), are not subject to public debate and deliberation. On the one hand, questioning public 
‘perceptions’ remains a dominant concern of public engagement exercises, which maintain 
their original purpose of reducing conflict and securing support for scientific innovation and 
expert-based policy-making. On the other hand, questions about the reasons and the ways 
in which certain issues, and not others, have become objects of public policy; how and as a 
result of whose action has this happened; and what kind of society are we trying to achieve 
through current innovation directions and priorities are prevented from emerging as key issues 
in technology assessment procedures.   
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3. technoloGy assessment in context
Perhaps easier for technocratic risk assessors to understand, but still neglected within risk-
assessment processes, is the significance of the context of implementation for evaluating the 
risks and claimed benefits of a technology. Technologies never operate outside a biophysical 
and social context, and it is their interaction with their contexts that generates effects, impacts 
and implications.  This is a statement of the obvious, yet its ramifications have yet to be fully 
recognised in risk assessment and other formal evaluations of technology. Put simply, in order 
to identify and evaluate the potential harms and benefits of a technology, we must know how it 
is likely to interact with its context, which requires knowledge of specific contexts as much as 
it requires knowledge of the technology itself. 
Knowledge of specific contexts is unlikely to come from “risk experts” or those with detailed 
knowledge of the technology derived from laboratory investigations and modelling. The kind 
of detailed knowledge of context necessary is often more experiential than formalised. People 
who are unfamiliar with the technology in question may nonetheless have knowledge of context 
that is highly relevant to assessing that technology. Such people are typically not involved in 
formal risk assessment processes.
Formal risk-assessment processes for GMOs may make reference to the interaction of the GMO 
with its (implicitly, biophysical) environment, but have no requirements or methods in place 
for acquiring knowledge of specific contexts or evaluating the effects of the interaction (e.g., 
EU directive 2001/18/EC). In the US, the APHIS processes of notification and de-regulation 
assume that particularities of environment are irrelevant to the potential impacts of GMOs. 
Projects of harmonisation of GMO regulation, such as those championed by the OECD and 
WTO, tend to rule out a priori any genuine engagement with context.
What is true for potential hazards is true a fortiori for claimed benefits. The projected benefits 
of developing or applying a technology are rarely given the same scrutiny as its potential harms. 
Projected benefits are key elements in public funding agencies’ (as well as private investors’) 
decisions to fund the technology’s development, and they are weighed against risks in regulatory 
agencies’ decisions to permit the deployment of a technology. Insufficient scrutiny of benefit 
claims can thus lead to poor investment and regulatory decisions.  As with risk, the assessment 
of (claimed) benefits, such as it is, rarely seeks detailed knowledge of the contexts with which 
the technology must interact if the benefits are to be realised.
There is ample evidence of the importance of contextual knowledge to evaluating risks. In 
Wynne’s post-Chernobyl study of the interactions between Cumbrian sheep-farmers and techno-
scientific personnel operating as risk managers, he found that the value placed by scientists on 
universally applicable models blinded them to the importance of local context. They ignored 
“farmers’ own knowledge of their local environments, hill-sheep characteristics, and hill-farming 
management realities” (Wynne 1992: 287). This specialist hill-farming expertise, which was 
vincenzo Pavone, joanna Goven & riccardo Guarino
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“not codified anywhere” and was “passed down orally and by apprenticeship” (Ibid., p. 295), 
in fact proved essential to predicting the behaviour of radioactive elements in the soil and to 
formulating competent strategies to manage the problem. Irwin’s (1995) discussions of the 
risk assessment of the organo-phosphate pesticide 2,4,5-T again highlight “expert” blindness 
to local or experiential knowledge. In this case, the UK Advisory Committee on Pesticides 
(ACP) concluded that the pesticide was safe, provided it was used “in the recommended way.” 
Farmworkers, with knowledge of actual farm practices as well as of the social (power) relations 
involved, argued that it could not be judged safe because the prescribed precautions could not 
be taken in the actually existing contexts of use: “the conditions envisaged by members of the 
[ACP] . . .are impossible to reproduce in the field” (1995: 17 - 18).  
There is also evidence of the importance of contextual factors to the realisation of claimed 
benefits. Outcomes of attempts to evaluate the performance and economic impact of GM crops 
in developing countries have been highly inconsistent. This, as Glover has shown in his survey 
of evaluations of “pro-poor” effects of Bt cotton, is a result of abstraction from context: 
The efforts of analysts have been largely confounded, though, not only by the sheer complexity 
of the factors involved, but because the external variables they have struggled to control and 
exclude are actually essential to understanding the impacts of new crop varieties on farms. 
In other words, the strenuous efforts to rule out the effects of ‘externalities’ can be seen as a 
reflection of a basic failure to recognise the fundamental importance of contextual factors in 
complex socio-technical systems. (Glover 2009: 37)
The relevant contexts include both biophysical factors (e.g., the local suitability of the 
background germplasm, seasonal rainfall, irrigation, soils, pest attacks and diseases) and socio-
political factors: 
[S]eed choices, pest-management strategies, cropping patterns and farming systems are 
embedded in a particular household’s or farmer’s wider livelihood strategy, which in turn is 
embedded in a set of social and institutional relationships and processes. (Glover 2009: 38)
The value of attending to specificities of context is illustrated here with examples from research 
exploring risks and potential benefits from implementing biopharming in New Zealand (Goven 
et al. 2008; Morris et al. 2009; Goven et al. 2009). Biopharming involves the production of 
plants and animals that have been genetically engineered to produce pharmaceutical substances 
(in, e.g., their leaves, seeds or milk) and the extraction and purification of those substances for 
use in humans. It is promoted as a lower-cost and more flexibly scalable production process. It is 
still unclear whether biopharming will be successful in these terms. Those who see biopharming 
as beneficial for New Zealand have portrayed it as a great opportunity for New Zealand farmers 
to add value to their products. The success of this strategy depends not only on the commercial 
success of biopharming as a drug-production process, but also on the practicalities of New 
Zealand farmers taking up biopharming. 
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Unlike other forms of drug production, biopharming poses the risk of contamination of the food 
supply, especially if the drug is made in a food-producing platform (such as food-crop plants or 
cow, sheep or goat milk). The prevention of contamination requires strict containment. Farmers 
and others with practical experience of managing plants and animals and their products are an 
excellent source of knowledge relevant to whether or not strict containment on a “biopharm” is 
feasible. Indeed, as suggested by Mauro and colleagues (2008, 2009), farmer knowledge would 
appear to be a valuable source of information for the evaluation of agricultural technologies, 
including GM technologies, in general, yet it remains neglected by policy-makers and 
researchers, especially in the global North.
The farmers and others associated with the types of farming most likely to “host” biopharming, 
that is, dairying and seed farming, identified a range of risk factors related to specificities 
of context. For example, the experience of those in seed farming suggested that complete 
containment in open-field conditions is impossible due to the impacts of wind, insects, birds 
and other animals.  Most specialist seed farming in New Zealand is carried out in Canterbury, 
famous for its north-westerly winds, posing threats of cross-pollination. Although systems have 
been devised to minimise such contamination, local knowledge indicated that such systems are 
not adequate for the prevention of all contamination: 
[I]n the Canterbury Plains, I don’t know how you ever restrict that…. It’s probably likely that 
the outcross is going to be not just 10 yards down the road, but probably 10k or 15k down the 
road. So 3k or 5k isolation’s probably a waste of time.
It is often assumed that the risks posed by contexts can be mitigated by procedural requirements 
or controls imposed on the use of the technology. However, the New Zealand research 
also questions whether it is practical to assume that mandated controls will be consistently 
implemented. This, too, will be a function of context, both social and biophysical. Biopharming 
for farmers would be an economic activity like any other.  This creates a situation in which 
there may be economic incentives to flout containment requirements. Farmers noted that rules 
are most often ignored when there is an economic incentive not to follow them. As with any 
product, increased market supply or reduced market demand may erode the profitability of 
the operation, whilst the existence of potentially competing production platforms4 could bring 
about sudden increases in supply (and reductions in price). Biopharm animals may become ill, 
rendering them an economic liability. Costs to farmers may increase unexpectedly and render 
the contract less profitable. Such pressures experienced by a farmer directly or through his/her 
employer could provide an incentive not to follow the rules.
4   That is, biopharm crops would compete economically with each other and with biopharm ani-
mals as “production platforms” or “bioreactors”producing therapeutic proteins, and both would compete with 
laboratory (vat) production.  At least to date, biopharming is an alternative method for producing drugs that can 
already be produced in other systems, rather than a source of new drugs.
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A relevant example supplied by dairy farmers of non-adherence to risk-management rules 
involves herds containing tuberculosis-infected cows. Infected animals must be made readily 
identifiable, and there are restrictions on their movement. However, some farmers flout these 
rules, moving the infected herds without permission.  Those involved in seed production noted 
that it is difficult to ensure that a combine harvester is completely clear of previously harvested 
plant material. Economic pressures might result in not cleaning harvesters as well as they 
perhaps should: 
Are you going to spend another three hours [cleaning the combine] in the sunshine, [when] you 
could be combining and the rain’s forecast for the next day?  Probably not … I can give you the 
PC [politically correct] answer, ‘no, no, we signed the documents and we’ll do that.’  I think in 
practical terms corners get cut. 
Such incentives are intertwined with ownership and management arrangements and with 
farmers’ own assessments of and attitudes toward risks. Farmers’ and other operators’ own beliefs 
regarding the riskiness of an operation affect the likelihood that they will meticulously follow 
risk-management protocols. That is, if a protocol is felt to be arbitrary or out of proportion to 
the risk as the farmer understands it, it may not be followed. This implies that the effectiveness 
of controls is to a significant degree reliant on farmer discretion.  One example of this given by 
dairy farmers pertains to effluent disposal: They think ‘oh, this will do’, you know, ‘The rules 
are that strict, but if we do this and this, it might be all right’. 
In the seed sector, the demands of production and farmers’ confidence in their own abilities may 
shape attitudes toward following rules:
Farmers tend – they’re practical people cracking on with the job.  So they’re not looking at 
their ISO9000 quality control manual… It’s not sloppiness or anything like that.  But it’s just 
the practical operation of things.
Interviews with farmers also highlighted the ubiquity of human error.  Interviewees could relate 
a litany of human error that occurs in everyday farming practice. The milk of cows being treated 
with antibiotics, for example, is meant to be kept out of the milk sold off the farm, and these 
cows are marked to indicate this. However, farmers cited cases of such markings coming off 
or just being missed by the person responsible for milking. These errors occur despite strong 
economic incentives to comply:  companies receiving the milk impose heavy financial penalties 
for farmers whose milk contains antibiotics. 
Economic influences on farmers’ and other operators’ behaviour have implications for how risk 
is assessed. Rather than treating the economic dimensions of a proposed activity or organism 
as a separate issue, quantifiable in terms of economic cost and benefit, and human error as 
manageable through protocols and monitoring, economic context and human error should be 
viewed as integral to environmental and health risks.  If, as Marvier and van Acker (2005) argue, 
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“our evaluation of risk should assume that whatever transgene is being examined has a good 
chance of escaping”, the question becomes: does the purpose of the technology—understood 
not in terms of claimed, unproven benefits, but in terms of the aims of the system that produced 
it— justify the risk that it is inevitably imposing?
As noted above, promoters of technologies rarely ground their claims of benefits in the 
specific contexts with which the technology must interact if the benefits are to be realised. As 
with potential harms, operators’ understanding of their own situation is crucial to evaluating 
potential benefits. Biopharming is promoted to (and by) governments and regulators as bringing 
significant economic benefits to those jurisdictions and actors who engage in it. In New Zealand, 
biopharming has been framed as a solution to the problem of competitiveness in an economy 
dependent on commodity production, and consequently as a bringer of new options and benefits 
to New Zealand farmers. 5 On this basis, biopharming research and development have received 
generous public funding.
Specialty seed farmers and seed-production companies, however, described a distribution of 
market power that militates strongly against seed biopharming returning major benefits to New 
Zealand (Goven et al. 2009). With a similar distribution of power likely to obtain in the dairy 
sectors, dairy farmers, who doubted it would be possible to combine biopharm and conventional 
cows in the same operation,  would be reluctant to leave their existing supply relationships  to 
venture into biopharming (Goven et al. 2008). The practicalities of implementing biopharming, 
both in terms of measures to prevent contamination and in terms of relative distribution of 
market power, suggest that it is in fact unlikely that New Zealand farmers would benefit in 
any significant way from the introduction of biopharming. The likelihood and distribution of 
benefits is tightly linked not only to specificities of context, as argued here, but also to the 
processes of co-production discussed above: GMOs are a business strategy enabled through a 
particular intellectual property regime, and this drives both the framing of problems to which 
GMOs can be offered as a solution and the distribution (and nature) of benefits. 
4. eco-social analysis
GMOs affect the agri-food production system and have an impact not only on the environmental 
context into which they are introduced, but also in the way people feel, live and interact with 
this context. Social and ecological impacts of products and technologies are related. Whatever 
has a social impact interacts, as well, with ecological elements to constitute what we call the 
environment. For example, in many European countries efforts have been made to support bio- 
and organic farming, small-sized farms, local products, and cooperatives. This kind of territorial 
5   In other venues, particularly when in the midst of risk-assessment processes with public input, 
biopharming is promoted as the path to curing disease, even though to date biopharm R&D has focused on the 
production of generic versions of existing biopharmaceuticals.
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marketing has created a new eco-social equilibrium in many rural communities, mitigating 
land abandonment and helping in the preservation of significant traits of so-called “vanishing 
traditional landscapes”. In such a context, GMOs and their regime of production and innovation 
will inevitably interact not only with the ecological, but also the social equilibrium built on the 
ecological one. As a consequence, social analysis needs to be integrated with ecological studies 
on long-term environmental and eco-systemic changes affecting target farming areas. However, 
at least three main problems have so far prevented eco-social analysis into risk-assessment 
procedures: the lack of long-term studies, existing methodological deficiencies and a narrow, 
decontextualised approach to risks and benefits of GM crops. 
The lack of long-term studies maintains a fairly high uncertainty in the assessment of risks for 
the environment and human health, strengthened by the unpredictability of some by-products 
of genetic manipulation (Schubert 2002). For instance, Bt-corn has been created through 
the insertion of the genes coding for the Cry-toxins of Bacillus thuringiensis under specific 
promoters that should have acted only in the green parts of the plant, or in the pollen, but not 
in the roots (Saxena et al. 1999). Therefore, the steady occurrence of the toxin in the roots 
and exudates of Bt Corn provides a good example of an unpredicted attribute (which also has 
potential long-term implications on the microbial fauna in the soil).
All the relevant literature on the environmental risks and benefits of the large-scale cultivation 
of GMOs compares the “environmental performances” of transgenic crops vs. the conventional 
ones, but little attention is deserved to the long-term consequences of the observed changes 
in the frequency and distribution of commensal species (target and non-target organisms) at 
the ecosystem scale. There has not been time enough to produce sound results on such issues 
(Pignatti & Guarino 2007). Modern agriculture became responsible of an ever-increasing trophic 
and ecological gap between cultivated areas and neighbouring ecosystems. This is regrettable 
not only for aesthetical or scientific reasons linked to  biodiversity conservation, but also for the 
simple, utilitarian reason that the more we reduce and select the species co-occurring with the 
crops, the more we reduce the probability that there will be early bio-indicators of unanticipated 
risks and implications of the introduced technologies. In the last fifty years, natural early-
warning signals were shown to be useful and effective instruments for the safeguard of human 
lives: for instance, the high toxicity and persistence of DDT and PCBs were identified in such 
way (Sheail 1985; EEA 2001).
Natural macro phenomena, and their changes and variations, may be considered, to a certain 
extent, predictable, but the more technology is able to transform the molecular characteristics of 
natural processes, the more the final outcome is unpredictable. This unpredictability proceeds 
from the existing gap between the pace regulating natural biological evolution, on the one hand, 
and the man-made technological evolution, on the other hand. Current nucleotide sequences are 
the result of biological evolution over three billion years. Changes in gene sequences may alter 
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gene products, which have an impact on other genes and on other organisms: each gene mutation 
triggers a series of spill-over effects until a new equilibrium is reached in the homeostatic 
context of the eco-system.  Molecules are connected to the eco-systems thanks to the intrinsic 
ability of living matter to connect, interact and move towards more and more complex levels of 
integration. These processes do not repeat themselves indefinitely, because the retroaction links 
responsible for preserving the homeostasis of the system are not completely self-contained but, 
rather, integrated in the evolutionary consistency of the biosphere. 
In this respect, the eco-system is not a complicated but a complex system. Complicated systems, 
though difficult to analyse, can be completely explored, provided that enough time and proper 
tools are available. Yet, complex systems, like biological ones, cannot be exhaustively analysed 
because their evolution is not predictable. In other words, whilst it is certainly possible to insert 
exogenous genes into a chromosome, it is impossible to predict and calculate the outcomes and 
the interactions that will follow over long periods. Traditional engineering is used to derive 
its certainty from measures and deterministic descriptions that allow for predictable results. 
Genetic engineering, in contrast, may well understand and quantify the productive performances 
of GMOs or their advantages in terms of a reduced need for fertilizers, but cannot predict or 
even foresee the medium and long term risks of introducing species that are alien to the global 
homeostatic equilibrium of the biosphere. Only natural selection processes will reveal beyond 
doubt whether these organisms will have been, from an evolutionary point of view, incorporated 
without major damages. Yet this process is very slow, and its pace is certainly incompatible 
with market requirements. 
From a methodological perspective, current risk assessment methods evaluate GM risks 
on the basis of risk/benefit analysis and short-term environmental impact in comparison to 
conventional crops. This type of evaluation, which focuses on a direct cause-effect approach, is 
inadequate to address environmental issues, for the homeostasis of the ecosystem is guaranteed 
by non-linear transformations. To date, we have accumulated significant evidence showing that 
environmental damage cannot be assessed through cost-benefit analysis, not only because the 
long-term impact cannot be easily predicted but also because the actual genetic modifications 
cannot be evaluated through simple calculations of causes and effects. Plant pathology, very 
much like human pathology, focuses more and more on degenerative alterations, which often 
emerge a long time after the exposure to the pathogenic agent has actually occurred (Lorenzini 
1999). As a result, not only is it incorrect to link xenobiotics and the actual damage in a cause-
effect relationship, it is also misleading to consider that a substance, or a genetic expression, is 
non-toxic just because it does not interfere with a given metabolic process (Cocucci 1996).
Facing these problems and considering that large fields cultivated with GM crops may have 
dramatic impact on the survival of the residual populations, plants and microorganisms existing 
in the agroecosystem, the EU is setting up a strategy aiming at preserving biodiversity through 
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the creation of protected eco-systems. However, this approach is flawed for two reasons: first, it 
is problematic to confine biodiversity in restricted spaces, leaving the remaining agroecosystem 
permeable to GM crops and, second, the prospective protected ecosystems are not big enough 
to be unaffected by external influences. This typically applies to Italy, where farm properties 
are relatively small and fragmented and the geomorphology of the territory makes the approach 
based on  protected eco-systems unfeasible.  
The italian case is especially interesting because it presents a number of characteristics that 
potentially invalidate the outcomes of eisk assessment studies conducted in other nations. Italy, 
for instance, possesses a high biological diversity, which results from a great variety of climatical 
and environmental factors in a relatively small territory, mainly characterized by  mountains, by 
the influence of the sea and by a prevalent orientation along the north-south line. It is generally 
accepted that to avoid cross-pollination and contamination it is necessary to place GM crops 
on big portions of flat land, contained by a belt of similar, conventional, crops. In Italy these 
conditions apply only to about 20 per cent of the territory. Moreover, in Italy still survives a 
significant variety of wild versions of cultivated crops, which makes the risk of contamination 
even higher than elsewhere. 
As a consequence, the risk/benefit analysis, instead of focusing on the performance comparison 
between GM and conventional varieties, should rather consider  the impact of GM crops on the 
local ecosystem and on the social and economic arrangements that have been so far built on 
that ecosystem. How convenient is to pave the way to GM crops in a country whose economy 
is based on local biodiversity, agricultural tourism, DOP productions, high quality wines and 
food? In fact, the economic success of these sectors rather suggests to follow the opposite 
strategy, declaring Italian territory GM-free and investing even more on these sectors to renew 
and strengthen the international reputation of a country where ecological biodiversity is no less 
attractive of historical and cultural diversity. 
For all these reasons, it is increasingly important to think in terms of an eco-social equilibrium, 
whereby the ecological homeostatic equilibrium is part and parcel with the socio-economic 
equilibrium reached around given cultivations, eating habits and farming practices, which have 
evolved during decades and are repository of traditions, values, meanings and community life 
interactions. 
5. conclusion
GMO assessment is a complex issue (not a complicated one), and risk assessment studies, no 
matter how sophisticated they are, cannot produce definite and unquestionable results, because 
it is not merely an issue of scientific advancement. In fact, risk assessment procedures embody 
social and political values, and so do the technologies assessed. For a socially and scientifically 
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more robust assessment, these values must be made explicit and taken into account when GM 
technologies are assessed. In this paper, thus, we tried to explore new approaches to GMOs 
from a broader perspective, which not only highlighted the cognitive limits and the political 
implications of current risk-assessment approaches but also took into consideration social, 
political, institutional and ecological elements. 
First, we suggested the politics and ethics of a given technology be unpacked, by addressing the 
emergence, the socio-technical networks, the power relationships and the economic interests 
that are tightly interrelated in the process of innovation and implementation. In this step – 
which tried to answer the question: what kind of future society is embedded in this technology? 
– the techno-social imaginaries and visions driving and underpinning technology innovation 
and implementation of Syngenta have been de-constructed and scrutinized, not only per se 
but also in relation to dominant socio-political imaginaries. Whilst GM producers patent their 
discoveries and impose royalties on their products, GMOs are framed as solutions to world 
hunger and environmental degradation. The debate therefore shifts to costs and benefits of GMOs, 
whilst the basic question of why GMOs were developed in the first place remains unanswered 
and, actually, disappears into the background. Visions and imaginaries sustaining technological 
innovation do matter: scientists’ and companies’ values need to be unpacked and analysed. 
In addition, it is time to incorporate non-technical expertise: lay publics, social scientists and 
farmers have access to relevant societal knowledge that has to inform risk assessment.
In the second step – which addressed the question: in what kind of society is this technology 
going to be implemented? – we have shown the necessity of evaluating a technology in its 
proposed context of implementation, as well as the need to access locally based, experiential 
knowledge in order to do this. Social and institutional practices operating at local and national 
levels provide important information on how a given technology is likely to be implemented 
and to interact with other social and technical artefacts. Risk-assessment procedures should 
evaluate not only how safe is a technology, but also how “safe” is the context (Goven 2006b). In 
this respect, our examples suggest that not only the biophysical and social elements of context 
but also the fundamental purpose of the technologies – in the sense of their driving forces 
or economic logic of development – as much as their technical capabilities are relevant to 
assessing potential harms and benefits.  
In the third step – which addressed the question: how is this technology likely to affect the eco-
social equilibrium of the area in which it is going to be introduced? –eco-social analysis was 
suggested. Social meanings, actions and relationships arise and are enacted around specific 
local environments and around the local understanding and framing of it. Changing these 
environments will inevitably change the socio-relational domains constructed around them. 
Therefore, eco-social studies should study the impact of GMOs not only on the biophysical 
ecosystem but also on the social community that is part and parcel of that ecosystem.
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In sum, we argue that frame analysis, context analysis and eco-social analysis should be 
performed along with the trajectory of the technology at stake, and accompany the traditional risk 
assessment procedures to ensure social compatibility and political accountability and ecological 
sustainability. These three steps may help consolidate a more robust social assessment, which 
we define as an in-context trajectory evaluation. From this perspective, it emerges that there 
might be a number of socio-political reasons to support a moratorium on GMOs in Europe even 
if they come to be considered, according to current risk-assessment approaches, as technically 
safe. 
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